THE EFFECTS OF MILITARY RULE IN NIGERIA.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The origin of the Nigerian Military could be traced to the mid-nineteenth century when the European powers gained a strong foothold on Africa and the bid for delineation of colonial territories was underway. Intense rivalries for colonies among the Europeans and especially between Britain and France made the imperialist establish forces that would protect and maintain their colonial states and trading interests on the shores of their Africa Colonies. To this end, Britain between 1897 and 1914 recruited natives from their colonies in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria and established the West Africa Frontier Force (WAFF). The Nigeria part of the WAFF was conscripted in three locations, Lagos, Calabar, and Lokoja respectively (Okorie, 2008).

Before this time, one of the British Trading Companies, The Royal Naval Company had established an armed forces group known as The Royal Naval Company Constabulary (RCN Constabulary) to protect its trading rights and activities in the Niger Basin. Also between 1891 and 1892, the Oil Rivers Irregular which was later called the Niger Coast constabulary had been set up to guard the Southern Oil territories of the Niger area and in 1900 when colonial rule had been imposed the RCN Constabulary who mainly comprised the northern Regiments; having Northerners as its first and second battalion, was merged with the Niger Coast

Constabulary as the third battalion of the southern regiment (Guttridge, 1964 as cited by Evelyn, 2015). It was these battalions that formed the Nigeria arm of the British WAFF colonial army intending to cope with the military problems posed by Anglo-France rivalry and indigenous oppositions in British West African territories. In 1956 the Nigeria arm of British

West Africa Frontier Force was renamed The Nigeria Military Force of the Royal West Africa

Frontier Force and on independence was incorporated into the country as the Nigeria Army (Guttridge, 1964 as cited by Evelyn, 2015).

Going by this history, it has been argued that the Nigeria army of independence having trained by Britain inherited some of the colonial imperialistic nature as they were conscripted not just to protect their frontiers but oppress natives who opposed their masters; the army was used to suppress the Tiv who were opposed to the Hausa Fulani domination of the Northern owing to long-standing difference between the natives especially as it pertains to religion and the various conflicts that ensued in the western and eastern regions- Egba and Igbo lands- where they had core major ethnics groups (Tamuno, 2004). Also, even though the army was not trained to govern, their British colonial military officers were involved in the administration of government. Hence it was not surprising that when the opportunity prevailed the military took firm hold of power.

 

During the early years of independence, the ethnic/religious crises that existed amongst the different groups resurfaced to threaten the unity of the nation. The struggle for control at the centre became the priority of the regional leaders and political parties that sprang up. A significant issue of distrust and insecurity was caused by the rumour of inflation of the result of the 1962-3 census which was tilted in favour of the north, the marred election of 1964, gross misapplication of public funds, and the inability of the civil government to pursue its policies and provide security for the peoples. Thus, the disruption of activities that ushered in the first

Military regime, a coup that led to the demise of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa the Prime Minister of the first republic. (Eghosa, 2014)

Aguiyi Ironsi who became the first military leader promised to stamp out corruption, tribalism, nepotism and regionalism that characterised the civil government and hand overpower. But factions within the military emerged to show their grievances over the way he distributed power, they accused him of forming an Igbo League. This was born out of the fact that most of the officers he promoted and appointed as of head different sections were Igbos. This division in the army led to the counter-coup of July 1966, Ironsi’s assassination and the appointment of Yakubu Gowon as the head of state.

Gowon’s regime lasted until 1975. Shortly after his appointment, Gowon promised to return governance to the civil society; he divide the regions into twelve states but division within the military again created the arguments that cumulated into the civil war; the killings of Igbo officers during the July Coup, the electoral fraud and the riots in the north that led to Igbo massacre. Ojukwu the then Governor of Eastern Nigeria, argued that the tribes could not live as members of the same country and this was followed by the declaration of the Republic of Biafra.  Thus, Gowon’s administration got entangled in the civil war that almost tore the nation apart. It is important to note that the problem of the 1960s was the result of economic, ethnic, cultural, religious and political tensions that existed among the different ethnics even before independence. The leaders concentrated more on dominating the politics at the centre than addressing various grievances among the many ethnics of Nigeria. It was this negligence that cumulated to the 30 months Civil War.

After the war, Gowon initiated policies that would reconcile the peoples together as one but his unwillingness to return power to civilians made his administration unpopular and his overthrow in 1975 while he was at the OAU Summit in Kampala.

Gowon was succeeded by yet another military leader General Murtala Mohammed who was in turn assassinated in an abortive coup on February 13, 1976. Murtala was replaced by his second in command Olusegun Obasanjo. The Murtala/Obasanjo government accused Gowon of being indecisive in the policies that would address the problems of the nation- Gowon’s economic and political policies was seen as stagnant especially in the areas of price control, industrial and infrastructural development and mismanagement of the public resources.

Obasanjo followed the policies of his predecessor Murtala and initiated numerous reforms in public life, created more states in the Federation and handed over to a civilian. Alhaji Shehu Shagari who became the president of the second republic of Nigeria, was accused of sweeping the country’s treasury. His government was accused of corruption and indiscipline by the Buhari/Idiagbon administration that overthrew it in 1983. Buhari claimed that his overthrow of the government was as a result of a ‘call to national duty’ that it was the duty of the military to promote and protect the integrity of the nation and to ensure orderliness in the society. His administration issued a public campaign against indiscipline known as “War Against

Indiscipline” (WAI). Buhari’s measures at correcting the ills of the society were severe, and the high handedness of the oppressed military civilians at every instance. These generated fear among civilians and widened civilian-military relationship. It was on this ground of violation of human rights that Babangida capitalized on when he displaced the Buhari’s regime in 1985 (Ajayi 2013).

General Ibrahim Babangida promised to bring an end to the human right abuses perpetrated by the Buhari’s regime and to hand over power to the civilians by 1990. Eventually, he perpetuated one of the worst human rights abuses in the history of military rule; he assassinated many military officers based on suspected coup attempts; he introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme which was supposed to improve the economy but brought untold hardship to the people. Babangida also failed in his promise to hand over power to civil government. The annulment of the June 12 election in 1993 sprang up strikes and protests that threatened the peace of the nation and following much rejection of his government Babangida handed over to the interim government under Chief Ernest Shonekan. Within three months of handover, General Sani Abacha seized control of the government and appointed himself Chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria. Abacha ruled Nigeria until his death in 1998.

Abacha’s regime was seen as the last straw because he carried out various abuses of human rights activities that led to the estrangement of Nigeria in the international community. Corruption under Abacha’s regime was high. General Abdul Salam Abubakar took over government upon the death of Abacha and established institutions and programs that ushered in the civilian government. In 1999, Abdulsalam handed over to President Olusegun Obasanjo thus bringing an end to military rule.

In all, the military rule the nation for twenty-nine (29) years. Since 1966 when Aguiyi took over governance, the problems of ethnicism and regionalism which caused disorderliness in the 1960s was not resolved, the other military leaders did not resolve these key issues either, even though they initiated different policies and structures these policies did not solve the problems and were oppressive in nature. Rather than addressing these key problems, the military only suppresses them and introduced new dimensions to the issues.

 

1.2 Statement of Problem

On independence, the leaders of the country were not only faced with the problems of governance but with that of maintaining the unity that has been bequeathed to them. Various political parties and interests’ groups emerged to influence decisions of the state as well as hold control of power at the centre. The Action Group (AG), the Northern People Congress (NPC) and the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) dominated the affairs of politics in the three regions that were created by the British government and subsequently inherited by the Nigerian government on independence (okorie, 2008).

One of the challenges faced by the Nigerian Army was the issue of increasing the Quota of other regions in the army to achieve equal representation in the force; this was because the nature of the British military favoured northern recruitment against other areas; the quota system allowed the north to recruit 50 per cent of the total numbers of army while the other regions were to hire 25% each. This was a major cause of insecurity in the military and various moves were made to restructure the arrangement. It was amidst this internal military crisis that the civilian government and society threatened the peace of the nation. The military in order to maintain orderliness, got entangled in politics (Eghosa, 2014).

The lack of understanding, intolerance and mistrust amongst the ethnics and regions of the country led to struggle for power as each region tried to dominate the affairs at the centre and to hold onto power for a long time. The Nnamdi Azikiwe government of 1963 when Nigeria became a Republic witnessed great disorderliness and disagreements by the various regional leaders as a result of the tensions of the 1962-4 census which was tilted in favour of the northern region. The census tensions and the marred election of 1964 escalated conflicts that disrupted the seeming peace and unity that existed. This led to the military intervention in January 1966 to quell the crises among the different ethnics/regions and restore unity in the state, and their subsequent unwillingness to return to civil rule. This also was followed by a series of coups and counter-coups until 1999 when an interim government under General Abdusalam Abubakar handed over power to civilians. This paper will examine the effect of the military on the country since 1960, considering the effect the different military regimes have had on the economic, political and geographical state of the country.

1.3 Research Objectives

The general objective of this research work is to understand the effect of the military on the growth and development of the country.

Specific objectives include

1. The effect of military rule on the democracy of the country since 1960 ii. The effect of military rule on the unity of the country since 1960 iii.            The effect of the military on the peace and progress of the country since 1960 iv.             The effect of military rule on the economic growth and development of the country since 1960

1.4 Research Questions

The researcher will seek to find answers to the following questions

1. What is the effect of military rule on the democracy of the country since 1960?
2. What is the effect of military rule on the unity of the country since 1960? iii. What is the effect of military on the peace and progress of the country since 1960? iv.        What is the effect of military rule on the economic growth and development of the country since 1960?

1.5 Scope of the Study

The research work will focus on the historical details of the military regime in the country. The researcher will consider the militart regimes from 1985 to 1998 where General Babangida and General Sani Abacha was at the realm. The researcher will use this period to clearly understand the effect of military regimes while comparing their effects with the civilian rule up to the point of established democracy.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The study is important to the following catrogies;

To the body of research, it will be first research that will analyse holistically the effect of the military on the core aspects of the country. Researcher can cite this work for continuous in the historical field of understanding the effect of the military regimes since independence.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Several theories have been advanced by scholars to explain the phenomenon of military rule. Military Rule and Politics cannot be separated so the researcher will apply political theories to explain the theoretical framework of Military Rule in Nigeria. The central argument upheld by almost all the theories is that the political structures of the countries concerned and the obvious weakness of regimes in such countries account largely for the incidence of military intervention in politics (Adebisi, 1998). First and foremost, the praetorian theory propounded by Greek philosopher Polybius adduce this state of structural decay in the political system as an incentive for military coup d’état. It maintains that there must be the collapse of the executive power as an excuse for the military to come to the political scene either by threat of force or actual use of force.

Ekeh (1998) observed that the original justification for military rule in Nigeria arose from the claim that the country’s civil politics were unruly and required a dose of military discipline. Permutter (1981) posited that the explanation for intervention can be found in the political, structural and institutional weakness of regimes and states. Permutter further stated that the most likely obvious incentive for military intervention is regime illegitimacy and inability to secure political support through the available channels. This scenario can be illustrated with the case of the Third Republic under the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida which created two political parties, drafted their manifestoes and eventually annulled the elections, thereby denying the would-be regime the needed legitimacy, so that the military can have an excuse for either holding unto power or intervening in politics.

Nowa Omoigui in his treatise “Nigeria: The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993,” wrote:

 

 

Based in part on the report of the Political Bureau, which was originally set up in 1986, a two-party system (one “a little to the right” and the other

“a little to the left”) was created in October 1989. They were the National

Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both parties were run and financed by the Government, which also arrogated to itself the right to write their party constitutions. The constitutional context was the 1989 Constitution (Decree #12 of 1989), based on work done by a Constitution Review Committee, ratified by the

Constituent Assembly and amended by the Armed Forces Ruling Council.

Among the eleven amendments imposed by the AFRC, three were defence and security related. One removed the National Assembly’s control over national security because, (according to the AFRC), it “exposes the chief executives and the nation to clear impotence in the face of threats to security”

Thus, in the face of this apparent weakness in the political structure of the Nigerian state, the Chief Ernest Shonekan led Interim National Government (ING) became very susceptible to Brigadier Sani Abacha’s predatory scheming. More so, the ING lacked legitimacy which enabled Abacha to go about consolidating and networking within the military, probing for weaknesses to oust the regime.

 

In further buttressing the position of the praetorian theory, Janowitz (1964) posited that the “internal characteristics” of the political system, such as the socio-cultural background of military men, skill, career lines, internal social cohesion and professional and political ideology could be adduced to explain the military’s intervention in politics. Similarly, Huntington (1968) argued that military intervention occurs because of the general politicization of social forces and institutions, and often acting as possessing the manifest responsibility to restore order among groups competing for political power in the midst disagreements on the legitimate method of resolving conflicts. Hence, Permutter (1981) adduced that there is a correlation between military interventionism and a nation’s level of development. Thus, a country with high level of development is likely to have very minimal, if not complete absence of, incidence of military coup d’état.

 

According to Adebisi (1998), the level of development can be measured in terms of the level of technological development, political pluralism, democracy, international status and respect, human rights records, patterns of distribution of wealth and power, education and health development etc. which all constitute vital indicators of political stability. For instance, Nigeria’s first military coup occurred at a time the nation was struggling with the task of development after gaining independence from the British colonialists. The incursion of the military in the political arena on January 15, 1966 was due largely to the foregoing factors of political and institutional instability. The failure of the civilian government to effectively manage the political structure of the country which was characterized by regional political structures leading to intense ethnic politics created the condition necessary for the military to strike.

 

Also, the practice of using the military forces for purely civil matters encouraged and even hastened the exposure of the Nigerian military to political corruption, and the temptation to stage coup d’état and organize a military junta. For instance, the military were used to quell the crisis in Western regions, the Tiv Riots, as well as in the military operations in the troubled countries overseas, e.g. the Congo crisis of the 1960 among others. Miller and Zimmennan (1987) however, have argued that external forces such great power politics and globalization could also contribute to intervention of the military in the political system. The praetorian theory therefore assumes that the military institution is hegemonic and must be completely disconnected from the civilian democratic realm

 

On the other hand, the psycho-social theories state that the ultimate explanation of sociopolitical phenomenon and personality are to be found in certain kinds of psychological processes. These processes are the products of some child-rearing practices which each new generation of mankind is subjected to. The type of socialization received by a generation of mankind therefore constitutes the real and objective motive in history (Dudley, 1973: 4). Therefore, the individual’s behaviour is largely determined by the socialization processes undergone.

On another token, the modernization theory posits that the military institution can be an agent of social change through their intervention in the political process to correct anomalies perpetrated by civilian democratic leaders. It argues that some militaries are capable of playing a democracy-promoting constitutional role in a post-authoritarian society. Such militaries often called “the interdependent military” are capable of providing institutional support to a nascent democracy because its institutional self-interests often align with the conditions that Madison and others have identified as conducive to the genesis of a constitutional democracy: institutional stability, political pluralism, and national unity. According to Obi (2004), In the 1960’s there was the feeling in some quarters that the military could be a modernizing force given its hierarchical structure, national character, its discipline and the educational qualifications of the officer corps.

 

However, the attempts by the military to intervene in politics usually fail to bring the desired results to the society in terms of development and attainment of democracy, human rights, freedom of expression etc. due to their organizational and authority structure. It is important to note as Obi (2004) rightly pointed out, that the fact that the military in Nigeria is a product of Nigerian history and in particular the colonial project; it reflected all the contradictions in the society. In its attempts to consolidate its hold on power and accumulate resources to become a class for itself, the military elite became politicised, but beyond that it militarised politics. The command structure and the requirement of mandatory obedience and loyalty to superior orders are incompatible with the most elementary principles of democracy. Therefore, the attempt to apply military discipline and tenets to civil issues often backfires and deprives the military regimes of needed legitimacy and credibility. Hence, their interventionist activities are denounced as mere pretentions to democratic values. Ekeh (1998) contended that military’s claim of instilling order and discipline in the polity is nothing but a mere ruse.

 

According to Ekeh, Nigerian military’s meaning of discipline led them into coups was completely defective. Overthrowing a government which military officers had sworn to protect was in fact an act of indiscipline. Discipline signifies an inner code of behaviour that honours important societal principles. Coups d’état have no redeeming values as acts of discipline, because they destroy respect for a societal institution of governance. The interesting thing about military rule in Nigeria is that it changed the meaning of discipline into obedience. Fear-driven obedience, that destroyer of genuine discipline, has been abroad during the decades of military rule. It probably reached its height in the twosome dictatorship of Buhari and Idiagbon (1983-1985) when Nigerians were harassed with some creed called “War on Indiscipline.” Disobedience before military authorities probably decreased for a while under this duumvirate. But indiscipline most certainly expanded. In the absence of discipline on the part of military rulers, raw violence became a tool of governance. Coup plotters who succeeded in overthrowing a government became honoured governors while those who failed in their coup attempts were punished with death sentences. Innocence had nothing to do with morality. It had everything to do with successful violence. Unsuccessful violence was condemned as immoral by rulers who had illegally overthrown governments that they swore to protect.

 

In these circumstances, loyalty in the armed forces has been hard to come by. Loyalty is no longer defined on the basis of institutional principles, but, on the grounds of obedience to those who control the implements of most violence. But, those who control the means of violence cannot be too trusting of their subordinates. Sadly, this skewed meaning of loyalty has created far more sectionalism (sarcastically referred to as ethnic and regional “mafias”) than what could make for a wholesome national military. Indeed, there is probably more sectionalism in the Nigerian armed forces today than in the civilian population. The gaping differences between the North and South in Nigerians’ perception of the military have been created by a military establishment that has a false meaning of loyalty by alienating the South in order to win the allegiance of the North.

 

In three decades of military rule, the separation between the military and civilians has grown deep and nasty. It painfully recalls the invidious distinction between colonizers and the colonized in colonial times. The Nigerian experiment with imposing military discipline on civil populations has failed woefully and, like other failed political ventures, should be retired from contemporary public affairs into history. Nigeria’s greatest misfortune flows from the inability, or reluctance, of the military leadership and their apologists to accept the judgment that, as this flawed experiment drags itself on, much damage is being done to a nation that military rule had ostensibly arisen to rescue. All these challenged the very basis of the military as a modernizing force (Ekeh, 1998).

 

More so, the Nigerian military has intervened severally and failed severally to transit to a democratic order, as the infamous annulment of the June 12, 1993 elections demonstrates.

The failure of General Ibrahim Babagida to hand-over power to a democratically elected government and General Sani Abacha’s resolve to become elected President at all costs vividly shows the glaring democratic pretentions of the military and highlights the fallacy of the modernising soldier. It excuses the basic fact that military rule of civil populations is illegitimate and will inevitably bear evil fruits (Ekeh, 1998; Adebisi, 1998). Based on the collapse of the executive power as an excuse for the military to come to the political scene either by threat of force or actual use of force.

 

Ekeh (1998) observed that the original justification for military rule in Nigeria arose from the claim that the country’s civil politics were unruly and required a dose of military discipline. Permutter (1981) posited that the explanation for intervention can be found in the political, structural and institutional weakness of regimes and states. Permutter further stated that the most likely obvious incentive for military intervention is regime illegitimacy and inability to secure political support through the available channels. This scenario can be illustrated with the case of the Third Republic under the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida which created two political parties, drafted their manifestoes and eventually annulled the elections, thereby denying the would-be regime the needed legitimacy, so that the military can have an excuse for either holding unto power or intervening in politics.

 

Nowa Omoigui in his treatise “Nigeria: The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993,” wrote:

Based in part on the report of the Political Bureau, which was originally set up in 1986, a two-party system (one “a little to the right” and the other

“a little to the left”) was created in October 1989. They were the National

Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).

Both parties were run and financed by the Government, which also arrogated to itself the right to write their party constitutions. The constitutional context was the 1989 Constitution (Decree #12 of 1989), based on work done by a Constitution Review Committee, ratified by the

Constituent Assembly and amended by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Among the eleven amendments imposed by the AFRC, three were defence and security related. One removed the National Assembly’s control over national security because, (according to the AFRC), it “exposes the chief executives and the nation to clear impotence in the face of threats to security”

Thus, in the face of this apparent weakness in the political structure of the Nigerian state, the Chief Ernest Shonekan led Interim National Government (ING) became very susceptible to Brigadier Sani Abacha’s predatory scheming. More so, the ING lacked legitimacy which enabled Abacha to go about consolidating and networking within the military, probing for weaknesses to oust the regime.

 

In further buttressing the position of the praetorian theory, Janowitz (1964) posited that the “internal characteristics” of the political system, such as the socio-cultural background of military men, skill, career lines, internal social cohesion and professional and political ideology could be adduced to explain the military’s intervention in politics. Similarly, Huntington (1968) argued that military intervention occurs because of the general politicization of social forces and institutions, and often acting as possessing the manifest responsibility to restore order among groups competing for political power in the midst disagreements on the legitimate method of resolving conflicts. Hence, Permutter (1981) adduced that there is a correlation between military interventionism and a nation’s level of development. Thus, a country with high level of development is likely to have very minimal, if not complete absence of, incidence of military coup d’état.

 

.According to Adebisi (1998), the level of development can be measured in terms of the level of technological development, political pluralism, democracy, international status and respect, human rights records, patterns of distribution of wealth and power, education and health development etc. which all constitute vital indicators of political stability. For instance, Nigeria’s first military coup occurred at a time the nation was struggling with the task of development after gaining independence from the British colonialists. The incursion of the military in the political arena on January 15, 1966 was due largely to the foregoing factors of political and institutional instability. The failure of the civilian government to effectively manage the political structure of the country which was characterized by regional political structures leading to intense ethnic politics created the condition necessary for the military to strike.

 

Also, the practice of using the military forces for purely civil matters encouraged and even hastened the exposure of the Nigerian military to political corruption, and the temptation to stage coup d’état and organize a military junta. For instance, the military were used to quell the crisis in Western regions, the Tiv Riots, as well as in the military operations in the troubled countries overseas, e.g. the Congo crisis of the 1960 among others. Miller and Zimmennan (1987) however, have argued that external forces such great power politics and globalization could also contribute to intervention of the military in the political system. The praetorian theory therefore assumes that the military institution is hegemonic and must be completely disconnected from the civilian democratic realm

 

On the other hand, the psycho-social theories state that the ultimate explanation of sociopolitical phenomenon and personality are to be found in certain kinds of psychological processes. These processes are the products of some child-rearing practices which each new generation of mankind is subjected to. The type of socialization received by a generation of mankind therefore constitutes the real and objective motive in history (Dudley, 1973: 4). Therefore, the individual’s behaviour is largely determined by the socialization processes undergone.

On another token, the modernization theory posits that the military institution can be an agent of social change through their intervention in the political process to correct anomalies perpetrated by civilian democratic leaders. It argues that some militaries are capable of playing a democracy-promoting constitutional role in a post-authoritarian society. Such militaries often called “the interdependent military” are capable of providing institutional support to a nascent democracy because its institutional self-interests often align with the conditions that Madison and others have identified as conducive to the genesis of a constitutional democracy: institutional stability, political pluralism, and national unity. According to Obi (2004), In the 1960’s there was the feeling in some quarters that the military could be a modernizing force given its hierarchical structure, national character, its discipline and the educational qualifications of the officer corps.

 

However, the attempts by the military to intervene in politics usually fail to bring the desired results to the society in terms of development and attainment of democracy, human rights, freedom of expression etc. due to their organizational and authority structure. It is important to note as Obi (2004) rightly pointed out, that the fact that the military in Nigeria is a product of Nigerian history and in particular the colonial project; it reflected all the contradictions in the society. In its attempts to consolidate its hold on power and accumulate resources to become a class for itself, the military elite became politicised, but beyond that it militarised politics. The command structure and the requirement of mandatory obedience and loyalty to superior orders are incompatible with the most elementary principles of democracy. Therefore, the attempt to apply military discipline and tenets to civil issues often backfires and deprives the military regimes of needed legitimacy and credibility. Hence, their interventionist activities are denounced as mere pretentions to democratic values. Ekeh (1998) contended that military’s claim of instilling order and discipline in the polity is nothing but a mere ruse.

 

According to Ekeh, Nigerian military’s meaning of discipline led them into coups was completely defective. Overthrowing a government which military officers had sworn to protect was in fact an act of indiscipline. Discipline signifies an inner code of behaviour that honours important societal principles. Coups d’état have no redeeming values as acts of discipline, because they destroy respect for a societal institution of governance. The interesting thing about military rule in Nigeria is that it changed the meaning of discipline into obedience. Fear-driven obedience, that destroyer of genuine discipline, has been abroad during the decades of military rule. It probably reached its height in the twosome dictatorship of Buhari and Idiagbon (1983-1985) when Nigerians were harassed with some creed called “War on Indiscipline.” Disobedience before military authorities probably decreased for a while under this duumvirate. But indiscipline most certainly expanded. In the absence of discipline on the part of military rulers, raw violence became a tool of governance. Coup plotters who succeeded in overthrowing a government became honoured governors while those who failed in their coup attempts were punished with death sentences. Innocence had nothing to do with morality. It had everything to do with successful violence. Unsuccessful violence was condemned as immoral by rulers who had illegally overthrown governments that they swore to protect.

 

In these circumstances, loyalty in the armed forces has been hard to come by. Loyalty is no longer defined on the basis of institutional principles, but, on the grounds of obedience to those who control the implements of most violence. But, those who control the means of violence cannot be too trusting of their subordinates. Sadly, this skewed meaning of loyalty has created far more sectionalism (sarcastically referred to as ethnic and regional “mafias”) than what could make for a wholesome national military. Indeed, there is probably more sectionalism in the Nigerian armed forces today than in the civilian population. The gaping differences between the North and South in Nigerians’ perception of the military have been created by a military establishment that has a false meaning of loyalty by alienating the South in order to win the allegiance of the North.

 

In three decades of military rule, the separation between the military and civilians has grown deep and nasty. It painfully recalls the invidious distinction between colonizers and the colonized in colonial times. The Nigerian experiment with imposing military discipline on civil populations has failed woefully and, like other failed political ventures, should be retired from contemporary public affairs into history. Nigeria’s greatest misfortune flows from the inability, or reluctance, of the military leadership and their apologists to accept the judgment that, as this flawed experiment drags itself on, much damage is being done to a nation that military rule had ostensibly arisen to rescue. All these challenged the very basis of the military as a modernizing force (Ekeh, 1998).

 

More so, the Nigerian military has intervened severally and failed severally to transit to a democratic order, as the infamous annulment of the June 12, 1993 elections demonstrates. The failure of General Ibrahim Babagida to hand-over power to a democratically elected government and General Sani Abacha’s resolve to become elected President at all costs vividly shows the glaring democratic pretentions of the military and highlights the fallacy of the modernising soldier. It excuses the basic fact that military rule of civil populations is illegitimate and will inevitably bear evil fruits (Ekeh, 1998; Adebisi, 1998). Based on the foregoing, this work adopts the praetorian theory as its theoretical framework because it clearly reflects the Nigerian military system while basing its findings on the shortfalls of the modernisation theory.

To the government and policy makers, this research work will bring to light+ the issues that affect the country since independence and ways to solve such national issues.

1.8 Methodology

In  order  to  address  the  abovementioned  objectives,  this  study  uses  a  methodology  that is  qualitative in nature, and the point of departure for this is therefore to examine and analyse  the  literature  that  exists  on  this  topic.  It  builds  on  the  coursework  that  has  already  b een  done,  elements  of  past  research,  observations  and  evidence  available  on  this  issue,   in  order  to  consolidate the theoretical background on this issue.  Quantitative  studies  of  Military Rule in Nigeria have  traditionally  sought  to  measure  the  effect of such regimes on the development of the country.

Thus, one  finds  in  quantitative  studies  a  wide  variety  of  economic and democratic  variables  and  relationships  deemed  fundamental  and important in  assessing   the impact of military rule on the country.

1.9 Definition of Terms

Civilian: This is a word used for someone who is not in the Police Force or Armed Forces or Fire Department. This is also used to mean the populace of a state; the word is used to differentiate the people of a country from those who risk their lives for others.

Government: the political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or inhabitants of communities, societies, and states; direction of the affairs of a state, community, etc.; political administration

Military Regime: A military government is generally any government that is administrated by military forces, whether or not this government is legal under the laws of the jurisdiction at issue, and whether this government is formed by natives or by an occupying power. It is usually carried out by military workers

Praetorian Theory: Praetorianism means excessive or abusive political influence of the Armed Forces in a country.

Power: power is the capacity of an individual to influence the conduct (behaviour) of others. Politics: is the set of activities that are associated with the governance of a country, state or area. It involves making decisions that apply to groups of members and achieving and exercising positions of governance—organized control over a human community.

THE EFFECTS OF MILITARY RULE IN NIGERIA.

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